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Organization members who engage in "moral objection" by taking a principled stand against ethically questionable activities help to prevent such activities from persisting. Unfortunately, research suggests that they also may be perceived as less warm (i.e., pleasant, nice) than members who comply with ethically questionable procedures. In this article, we draw on role theory to explore how legitimate power influences observers' responses to moral objection. We argue that individuals expect those high in legitimate power to engage in moral objection, but expect those low in legitimate power to comply with ethically questionable practices. We further propose that these contrasting role expectations influence the extent to which moral objectors are perceived as warm and subjected to social sanctions (i.e., insults, pressure, unfriendly behavior). We test our predictions with 3 experiments. Study 1, which draws on participants' prior workplace experiences, supports the first section of our mediated moderation model in which the negative association between an actor's moral objection (vs. compliance) and observers' warmth perceptions is weaker when the actor is high rather than low in legitimate power and this effect is mediated by observers' met role expectations. Study 2, an online experiment featuring a biased hiring task, reveals that the warmth perceptions fostered by the Behavior × Legitimate Power interaction influence observers' social sanctioning intentions. Finally, Study 3, a laboratory experiment which exposes participants to unethical behavior in a virtual team task, replicates Study 2's findings and extends the results to actual as well as intended social sanctions.

Keywords: ethics, legitimate power, role theory, person perception, social sanctions

Scholars have long emphasized the importance of preventing unethical activity in organizations (Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Treviño, 2008; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Numerous studies have chronicled the suffering that organizations and their members experience as a result of unethical practices such as workplace incivility (Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Cortina, Magley, Williams, & Langhout, 2001), abusive supervision (Aryee, Chen, Sun, & Debrah, 2007; Mitchell & Ambrose, 2007; Zellars, Tepper, & Duffy, 2002), sexual harassment (Fitzgerald, Drasgow, Hulin, Gelfand, & Magley, 1997; Gutek & Koss, 1993), and employee fraud (Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon, & Keating, 2007; Kelly & Hartley, 2010). At

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the individual level, exposure to unethical behavior increases psychological distress and job withdrawal, while reducing job satisfaction, commitment, and productivity (Aryee et al., 2007; Cortina et al., 2001; Tepper, 2000). At the organizational level, studies have documented the strategic, legal, and financial benefits of preventing ethical misconduct (Ashforth et al., 2008; Bamberger, 2006; Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008; Schnatterly, 2003). In fact, a recent survey estimated that internal fraud alone costs organizations a staggering 5% of their annual revenue, which translates to an annual global fraud loss of nearly $3.7 trillion (Ratley, 2014).

Scholars also agree that the willingness of employees to speak up when they witness a practice or behavior they believe to be morally wrong is essential in preventing unethical activity from spreading insidiously within organizations (Leavitt, Reynolds, Barnes, Schilpzand, & Hannah, 2012; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008; Sumanth, Mayer, & Kay, 2011; Treviño, 1992). Indeed, approximately 20% of all internal fraud cases in 2014 were detected as the result of proactive employee complaints (Ratley, 2014). In this article, we focus on these proactive complaints, which we refer to as "moral objection." We formally define moral objection as the act of speaking up or taking action to oppose a morally questionable practice, or refusing to participate in the practice. Moral objection is similar to employee voice in that it is a proactive challenge to the status quo (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). However, unlike most forms of voice, it involves an explicit appeal to ethical principles, is not necessarily constructive, and is not always directed at one's hierarchical superiors (Maynes & Podsakoff, 2014). Moral objection

might also be construed as a form of whistleblowing (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). However, whereas whistleblowing typically involves a complaint about activities that are clearly unethical to others who are not aware of the activities, moral objection involves a complaint about activities that are less blatantly unethical to others who (as we explain below) are often complicit in the activities. Unlike individuals who engage in what we refer to as "compliance," by remaining silent about or going along with ethically questionable tasks or procedures, individuals who engage in moral objection take a principled stand against such procedures (Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008), which helps to prevent them from persisting.

Most organizations appreciate the importance of moral objection and have implemented formal ethics policies or codes of conduct to encourage members to engage in it (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010; McCabe, Treviño, & Butterfield, 1996; Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 1999). Yet despite these policies, the literature presents conflicting views of the reactions that moral objectors in organizations are likely to receive. On one hand, research on punishment suggests that moral objection can help reaffirm important shared values, producing positive responses in those who observe it (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009; Treviño, 1986; Treviño & Ball, 1992). Employee voice behavior has also been shown to be positively associated with performance evaluations and appraisals (Grant, Parker, & Collins, 2009; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998; Whiting, Podsakoff, & Pierce, 2008). On the other hand, social psychological research has found that individuals who engage in moral objection can be viewed as less warm (i.e., warm, pleasant, nice) than compliant individuals (Minson & Monin, 2012; Monin, 2007; Monin et al., 2008), and the whistleblowing literature suggests that members of organizations who speak up about unethical activities are often subject to social sanctions such as social isolation, character defamation, or other forms of harassment (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005).

When individuals who engage in moral objection are viewed negatively or sanctioned, it may discourage others from standing up for their moral beliefs (Treviño, 1992; Warren & Smith-Crowe, 2008). Thus, the inconsistent findings reported above suggest that it is important to better understand the psychological pathways that influence whether moral objection produces positive or negative observer reactions. Prior research exploring these pathways has focused on observer self-threat. Specifically, observers who have previously complied with an ethically questionable activity experience self-image threat when someone else objects to the activity. As a result, these observers are motivated to view the objector as less warm (i.e., pleasant, nice) than observers who have not previously complied (Monin, 2007; Monin et al., 2008). Although these are valuable insights, informal pressures within organizations can inhibit the reporting of unethical conduct (Kish-Gephart, Detert, Treviño, & Edmondson, 2009; Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Smith-Crowe et al., 2014), such that acts of moral objection are often likely to be observed by individuals who have previously complied with the objectionable practice and experience at least some degree of self-threat. It is therefore critical to build on the existing literature by exploring the conditions under which observers who have previously complied with an ethically questionable practice view others who object to that practice less negatively. Such an exploration entails identifying additional pathways, beyond self-threat, that influence observer responses to moral objec-

tion, and explaining how attributes of actors as well as observers influence these pathways.

In this article, we develop and test a conceptual model that begins to explain why the consequences of engaging in moral objection and compliance vary for different actors. Drawing on organizational role theory (Biddle, 1986; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Katz & Kahn, 1978), as well as the literatures on power (French & Raven, 1959; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008) and person perception (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007), we propose that legitimate power—that is, power that stems from one's location in a formal institutional hierarchy (French & Raven, 1959; Lord, 1977)—is a personal attribute that is critical in determining how individuals who engage in acts of moral objection are viewed and responded to. Specifically, we propose that individuals expect those who are high in legitimate power to engage in confident, assertive behavior such as moral objection, while they expect those who are low in legitimate power to behave more passively. As a result, we argue that observers are likely to perceive moral objectors who are high in legitimate power as warmer than low-power objectors, and less likely to subject them to social sanctions—active attempts to harm the objectors through insults, spreading rumors, being unfriendly, pressuring, and providing negative feedback. Figure 1 summarizes our conceptual model. After more thoroughly developing our arguments, we report the results of three experiments that test our predictions.

In exploring how individuals' behavior in the face of ethically questionable practices (compliance vs. moral objection) interacts with their legitimate power to influence observers' warmth perceptions and social sanctions, the present research makes several important theoretical contributions. We contribute to the literature on moral objection by highlighting a novel psychological mechanism (met role expectations) that influences observers' reactions to moral objection and compliance. This allows us to complement prior theoretical accounts based on observer self-threat and shed new light on the conditions under which moral objectors receive less negative responses from observers who have complied with the objectionable task or practice. We also contribute to the literatures on voice, whistleblowing, and behavioral ethics by identifying high legitimate power as a personal attribute that can reduce the negative consequences of moral objection. Prior research has largely not considered legitimate power as a differentiator of how individuals who engage in proactive challenges to the status quo are received, which may explain why this research has reported


Figure 1. Conceptual model explaining observers' responses to moral objection.

conflicting results. Moreover, while prior studies have focused on either the perceptual or the behavioral consequences of moral objection and other related forms of behavior (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005), we develop and find support for a model that incorporates both of these types of consequences by linking observers' warmth perceptions to their social sanctioning intentions and behavior. We find a consistent pattern of results across three different populations of participants, three different operationalizations of moral objection, and two different approaches to measuring social sanctions, which increases our confidence in the validity and generalizability of our conclusions (Lykken, 1968).

Theory and Hypotheses

Moral Objection, Legitimate Power, and Warmth Perceptions: A Role Theory Account

Role theory explains how social positions influence individuals' behavior, as well as their expectations for others' behavior (Biddle, 1986; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Katz & Kahn, 1978). The theory holds that social positions have sets of characteristic behaviors— "roles"—associated with them. The behaviors associated with social positions are widely agreed-upon and give rise to role-based behavioral expectations—evaluative standards that are applied to the behavior of those who occupy the positions (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Research grounded in role theory has established that social power, and particularly legitimate power, is an important source of role expectations (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Specifically, individuals who are high in legitimate power are widely expected to behave *agentically*; in other words, in a manner that is assertive, controlling, independent, and confident. For instance, Schein (1973) found that individuals expect formal managers to be confident, action-oriented, and ambitious, while Martell, Parker, Emrich, and Crawford (1998) found that behaviors such as acting as a change agent and displaying courage in the face of adversity were viewed as most appropriate for individuals in positions of formal authority. In contrast, individuals low in legitimate power are expected to behave more passively and compliantly. This is thought to involve waiting for instructions from the high-power members of one's group or organization, and then carrying out the instructions efficiently and without asking unnecessary questions (Fiske, 1992; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Milgram, 1974).

Building on role theory, we propose that actors who engage in moral objection are more likely to meet observers' role expectations when they are high rather than low in legitimate power. Moral objection involves explicitly questioning the ethicality of a commonly accepted practice or task, and refusing to go along with the practice. Thus, it is an instantiation of the agentic (i.e., confident, independent, change-oriented) behavior that is widely expected of high-power individuals. When individuals high in legitimate power engage in moral objection, their behavior is likely to meet observers' role expectations in that the objector will be seen as confidently encouraging the group to adopt higher ethical standards. In keeping with this argument, research has found that employees expect formal leaders to be a significant source of ethical guidance in the workplace (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009; Treviño, 1992; Treviño & Ball, 1992). When individuals low in legitimate power engage in moral

objection, however, this is likely to violate observers' role expectations, as observers will expect low-power individuals to support institutionalized practices rather than questioning the ethicality of these practices (Eagly & Karau, 2002).

We further propose that the extent to which acts of moral objection conform to observers' role expectations will influence the degree to which observers perceive the objector to possess interpersonal warmth. Warmth perceptions, which reflect evaluations of an actor as nice, friendly, and pleasant, are a foundational component of person perception across cultures and situations (Fiske et al., 2002; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). Theories of person perception suggest that the level of warmth observers attribute to a particular actor is based on inferences about motive: actors are likely to be viewed as warm if they are perceived to have benevolent, as opposed to hostile or competitive intentions (Cuddy et al., 2008). Building on this theoretical foundation, we argue that individuals who conform to role expectations should be viewed as warm, pleasant, and nice (high in warmth) because they will be seen as unselfishly modifying their behavior to ensure effective group coordination. In contrast, individuals who violate role expectations are more likely to be seen as unpleasant, cold, and mean (low in warmth) in that they will be perceived as pursuing their personal agendas in a manner that disrupts the group's work activities. Thus, we hypothesize that moral objectors who are high in legitimate power are more likely than low-power objectors to be perceived as warm, and that this effect is mediated by observers' met role expectations.

> *Hypothesis 1:* An actor's behavior in ethically questionable situations (compliance vs. moral objection) interacts with his or her legitimate power to determine observers' warmth perceptions, such that the relationship between moral objection and warmth perceptions is more negative when the actor is low in legitimate power than when the actor is high in legitimate power.

> *Hypothesis 2:* The interactive effect of an actor's behavior and legitimate power on observers' warmth perceptions is mediated by observers' met role expectations.

Observers' Social Sanctions

Although the level of warmth observers attribute to an actor who engages in moral objection is significant in and of itself, warmth perceptions are most consequential to the extent that they influence observers' subsequent behavior. Thus, we extend our theorizing to consider how the warmth perceptions produced by the interaction between an actor's moral objection or compliance and legitimate power influence observers' social sanctions. Consistent with the literatures on person perception (Cuddy et al., 2007; Cuddy et al., 2008) and whistleblowing (e.g., Dworkin & Baucus, 1998; McDonald & Ahern, 2000; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005), we define social sanctions as behavior intended to overtly affect the actor in a negative way—for instance, insulting, socially rejecting, pressuring, and/or providing negative feedback.

Person perception theory suggests that in social situations, individuals assess whether an actor is high or low in warmth, and then plan their own behavior in light of that information (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Wojciszke, 1994). Actors perceived to be

low in warmth are seen as cold, unpleasant, and mean—in other words, as an interpersonal threat. As a result, we propose that observers will be motivated to sanction low-warmth actors by being unfriendly toward them, pressuring them to modify their behavior, and/or giving them negative feedback. As Warren and Smith-Crowe (2008, p. 91) noted, "negative sanctions play an important role in transmitting information regarding an individual's deficiency along some behavioral expectations, as well as motivating behavior through the introduction of aversive stimuli or the elimination of positive stimuli." When an actor is perceived to be high in warmth, however, observers are likely to view social sanctions as unnecessary, because they will see the actor as friendly and prosocially oriented. Thus, we predict that the increased warmth attributed to moral objectors who are high as compared to low in legitimate power should make high-power objectors less likely than low-power objectors to be sanctioned by observers.

> *Hypothesis 3:* An actor's behavior (compliance vs. moral objection) in ethically questionable situations interacts with his or her legitimate power to influence observers' social sanctions, such that the relationship between moral objection and social sanctions is more positive when the actor is low in legitimate power than when the actor is high in legitimate power.

> *Hypothesis 4:* The interactive effect of an actor's behavior and legitimate power on observers' social sanctions is mediated by observers' warmth perceptions.

Overview of Studies

We tested our hypotheses with three experiments, each of which examined a portion of our overall conceptual model. This approach allowed us to leverage the power of experiments to establish causal relationships while ensuring parsimony in our study designs, reducing common method variance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003), and replicating many of our central findings across multiple examples of moral objection and samples of participants. In Study 1, working individuals recalled an instance when they failed to take action in response to a coworker's unethical or ethically questionable behavior and reported their perceptions of another coworker who either did or did not object to the behavior. Study 2 was an online experiment that exposed participants to a moral objector who refused to comply with a hiring task with racist and sexist undertones. Finally, Study 3 examined participants' reactions to a virtual team member who refused to complete a case analysis project due to concerns about child labor.

Study 1

Method

Study 1 explored how an actor's behavior when confronted with ethical violations interacts with his or her legitimate power to influence observers' warmth perceptions (Hypothesis 1), and the importance of observers' met role expectations in explaining this relationship (Hypothesis 2). This study focused on establishing met role expectations as an alternative mechanism to the self-threat

pathway identified by prior research in explaining the warmth observers attribute to individuals who engage in moral objection or compliance. Another objective was to test our hypotheses in the context of incidents of moral objection and compliance that occurred in actual organizations. Drawing on the critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954), we asked participants to recall an instance when they noticed a coworker engaging in unethical or ethically questionable behavior but did not address the behavior themselves. We then asked them to rate the warmth of another coworker who either did or did not take a principled stand against the same unethical behavior, and who was either high or low in legitimate power. The study employed a 2 (Behavior: Compliance vs. Moral Objection) × 2 (Legitimate Power: Low vs. High), between-subjects design.

Participants. A sample of 274 full-time working adults participated in the study. Participants were recruited through a survey response panel administered by Qualtrics, and participated in exchange for a small gift or cash payment. Participants' average age was 43.14 years ($SD = 11.83$), 45% were male, 73% were Caucasian, and 14% were African American. Participants had an average organization tenure of 8.23 years ($SD = 7.03$), and an average of 20.81 years of overall work experience ($SD = 10.79$).

Procedure. This study combined the critical incident technique with random assignment to experimental condition. Our theorizing focuses on individuals' reactions and responses to a specific act of moral objection or compliance, and the critical incident technique has been recommended over more traditional survey-based approaches as a means of capturing participants' responses to discrete, real events (rather than hypothetical or researcher-created events, Hershcovis, 2011; Morgeson, 2005). In studies adopting the critical incident technique, participants are asked to recall an event with certain characteristics and describe it in detail. Participants then respond to a series of survey questions describing their reactions to the event. When administered in this way, the critical incident technique has been shown to be a valid and effective way of assessing individuals' perceptions and reactions to unethical behavior (Mitchell, Vogel, & Folger, 2015). The technique has been widely used by organizational scholars in both survey (DeRue & Wellman, 2009; Morgeson, 2005; van Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005) and experimental (Casciaro, Gino, & Kouchaki, 2014; Mayer, Greenbaum, Kuenzi, & Shteynberg, 2009) research designs. In this study, we manipulated actors' behavior and legitimate power by providing participants with more specific instructions about the type of event to recall.

Behavior manipulation. To manipulate moral objection versus compliance, we asked participants to think about an instance when another member of their work group (the focal employee) either took action (moral objection condition) or did not take action (compliance condition) to address the coworker's unethical behavior.

Legitimate power manipulation. Consistent with prior manipulations (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Lord, 1977), we manipulated legitimate power by varying the focal employee's level of formal authority. We asked participants in the high legitimate power condition to recall a situation in which the focal employee held a high-level formal position—that is, "had a high level of formal decision-making authority and numerous other group members who officially reported to him/her." We asked participants in the low legitimate power condition to recall a

situation in which the focal employee occupied a low-level formal position—that is, "had no formal decision-making authority and no other group members who officially reported to him/her."

After recalling a specific incident, participants wrote a detailed description of the event. We asked them to describe what the ethically questionable behavior was, who the focal employee was, and what consequences the unethical or ethically questionable behavior ultimately had.

Met role expectations. After completing their descriptions, participants responded to items that measured the extent to which the focal employee's behavior met their role expectations. Given no widely accepted measure of met role expectations exists, we created a three-item measure based on existing descriptions of organizational role expectations (Biddle, 1986; Eagly, 1987; Katz & Kahn, 1978). The items are, "Given this individual's formal position and level of authority, his/her actions were 'reasonable', 'appropriate', and 'made sense'" ($\alpha = .94$). As described in Appendix A, pilot testing supported the convergent and discriminant validity of this measure.

Warmth perceptions. We measured warmth perceptions with three items developed by Monin et al. (2008). Participants used a 7-point, bipolar scale to rate the extent that they perceived the prior participant to possess the following traits: "warm–cold," "pleasant–unpleasant," and "nice–mean" ($\alpha = .89$).

Control variables. Although random assignment to condition ensured individual differences among participants would not impact our findings (Singleton & Straits, 1999), we were concerned that our research design might produce systematic differences between conditions in the nature of the event or focal employee that participants recalled. If this were true, these differences would constitute potential alternative explanations for our results (Sigall & Mills, 1998). To guard against this possibility, we considered several aspects of the event and the focal employee as potential control variables. Specifically, we measured *recency of event* (in years), *ease of recall of event* (1 = *very difficult*, 7 = *very easy*), *severity of ethical violation* (1 = *extremely unethical*, 7 = *extremely ethical*), *focal employee gender* (0 = *female*, 1 = *male*), *focal employee organization tenure*, and *quality of participant's prior relationship with focal employee* (1 = *poor*, 5 = *excellent*). We also included the measure of *observers' imagined attraction* used by Monin et al. (2008) (three items assessing the extent participants perceived the prior participant liked and respected them, $\alpha = .94$) to account for the self-threat mechanism that prior research has found partially explains the reduced warmth attributed to moral objectors.

Results

Excluded participants. A total of 20 participants indicated they could not recall an event meeting the criteria we provided or did not write a description of an event. Because the critical incident technique requires participants' to report on their own direct experiences, we excluded these participants from our analyses. We also screened the data for participants who completed the study in an unusually short period of time or who used the same scale anchor point to respond to at least eight consecutive items. We excluded the resulting five participants to guard against careless responding (Meade & Craig, 2012). Finally, because moral objection involves taking a stand when confronted with an ethically

questionable practice, we excluded 10 participants who rated the situation they described in their essays as "ethical" or "extremely ethical." This resulted in a final sample of 239 individuals. The pattern of results and significance levels we report do not change when the excluded participants are included.

Manipulation checks. In the moral objection condition, 109 of 117 participants indicated that the focal employee stood up or took action in response to the unethical event they described. In the compliance condition, 116 of 122 participants indicated that the focal employee did not stand up or take action in response to the unethical event. These differences between conditions are significant $\chi^2(1, N = 239) = 186.29, p < .001$. To check the efficacy of our legitimate power manipulation, we reviewed the essays participants wrote describing the event. Although not every essay described the focal employee's level of legitimate power, in the high legitimate power condition, 73 of 122 responses mentioned that the focal employee possessed some level of formal authority. In the low legitimate power condition, nine of 117 responses mentioned that the focal employee possessed some level of formal authority. These differences between conditions are also significant $\chi^2(1, N = 239) = 72.05, p < .001$.

Preliminary analyses. We conducted a content analysis of participant's written descriptions to learn more about the types of unethical events they recalled. Following the procedure described by Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton (2013), and Strauss and Corbin (1998), the first author read participants' responses and assigned each one a code describing the nature of the unethical activity. The codes were then reviewed and similar codes were grouped into broader second-order themes. These themes and representative responses are summarized in Appendix B. The most common unethical or ethically questionable activity recalled by participants was theft (33 incidents), followed by incivility (29 incidents; e.g., disrespect, condescension, degradation; Cortina et al., 2001) and sexual harassment (22 incidents).

We conducted a series of two-way ANOVAs to determine whether participants' responses to our control variables differed by experimental condition. Participants in the high legitimate power condition described a focal employee who was higher in organizational tenure than participants in the low legitimate power condition $F(1, 235) = 4.85, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .02$. Participants in the moral objection condition reported having a marginally higher-quality prior relationship with the focal employee than participants in the compliance condition $F(1, 235) = 3.09, p < .10, \eta_p^2 = .01$ and also reported an event that they perceived as marginally more ethical $F(1, 235) = 3.46, p < .10, \eta_p^2 = .02$. No other main or interaction effects are significant.

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations between study variables. On average, participants found it "somewhat easy" to recall an event that met the criteria provided to them ($M = 5.08, SD = 1.44$), and viewed the behavior they observed as "somewhat unethical" ($M = 2.71, SD = 1.57$). In light of the ANOVA results and the correlations reported in Table 1, we included *severity of ethical violation*, *prior relationship quality*, and *observers' imagined attraction* as control variables in all subsequent analyses to eliminate alternative explanations and more accurately assess the relationship between moral objection/com-

Table 1
Study 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Recency of event	3.78	3.77	—									
2. Ease of recall of event	5.08	1.44	−.08	—								
3. Severity of ethical violation	2.71	1.57	−.05	−.13†	—							
4. Focal employee gender	.62	.49	.08	.00	.02	—						
5. Focal employee organization tenure	5.36	5.73	.00	−.08	.03	−.00	—					
6. Prior relationship quality	2.74	1.11	−.07	.03	.20**	.04	.20**	—				
7. Observers' imagined attraction	2.86	1.08	−.04	.04	.07	.01	.15*	.68**	—			
8. Behavior	—	—	−.04	.02	.12†	−.03	.04	.11†	.09	—		
9. Legitimate power	—	—	−.01	.06	−.08	.04	.14*	−.01	−.02	.02	—	
10. Met role expectations	2.82	1.33	−.07	−.05	.23**	−.02	.05	.52**	.47**	.38**	−.00	—
11. Warmth perceptions	4.29	1.57	−.02	−.06	.14*	.01	−.01	.63**	.58**	.06	.06	.52**

Note. $N = 237–239$ due to missing data. Focal employee gender dummy coded $0 =$ female, $1 =$ male. Behavior dummy coded $0 =$ compliance, $1 =$ moral objection. Legitimate power dummy coded $0 =$ low, $1 =$ high.
† $p < .10$, two-tailed.   * $p < .05$, two-tailed.   ** $p < .01$, two-tailed.

pliance, legitimate power and our focal outcomes.[1] Per the advice of Becker (2005) and Bernerth and Aguinis (2015), we did not control for organizational tenure because it was not correlated with either met role expectations or perceived warmth.

Given the strong positive correlations we observed between prior relationship quality, observers' imagined attraction, met role expectations, and warmth perceptions, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis on these items using LISREL v. 8.72 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 2005). A four-factor model with the items from each measure loading on a separate factor fits the data well, $\chi^2(30) = 49.42$, $p < .05$, CFI = .99, NNFI = .99 RMSEA = .06, and better than a series of three-factor models with the items measuring any two of these constructs loading together. Thus, we felt confident that the measures of prior relationship quality, observers' imagined attraction, met role expectations, and warmth perceptions assessed different constructs.

Warmth perceptions. Hypothesis 1 predicts that association between moral objection and observers' warmth perceptions is more negative when the actor is low in legitimate power than when the actor is high in legitimate power. We tested this hypothesis by conducting a two-way ANOVA with planned post hoc comparisons. There is not a significant main effect of either focal employees' behavior (moral objection or compliance), $F(1, 232) = .11$, *ns*, $\eta_p^2 = .00$, or legitimate power, $F(1, 232) = 1.01$, *ns*, $\eta_p^2 = .00$, on observers' warmth perceptions. However, the interaction between behavior and legitimate power is a significant predictor of warmth perceptions, $F(1, 232) = 10.33$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. As shown in Figure 2, moral objection (relative to compliance) is negatively associated with the perceived warmth of focal employees who are low in legitimate power $M_{\text{compliance—low legitimate power}} = 4.63$, $SE = .15$, $M_{\text{moral objection—low legitimate power}} = 4.10$, $SE = .16$, $d = −.54$, $S.E = .22$, $p < .05$[2], but positively associated with the perceived warmth of focal employees who are high in legitimate power $M_{\text{compliance—high legitimate power}} = 4.00$, $SE = .15$, $M_{\text{moral objection—high legitimate power}} = 4.43$, $SE = .15$, $d = .43$, $S.E = .21$, $p < .05$. These results support Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2 predicts that observers' met role expectations mediate the interactive effect of behavior and legitimate power on warmth perceptions. We tested this hypothesis using moderated path analysis (see Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007 for a more complete description of this procedure).

We used Model 8 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) to estimate conditional indirect effects and construct bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for significance testing. As shown in Table 2, Model 3, focal employees' behavior and legitimate power interact to influence observers' met role expectations ($b = .98$, $SE = .26$, $p < .001$), such that moral objection is positively associated with met role expectations for actors who are high in legitimate power, but not for actors who are low in legitimate power. Moreover, as shown in Table 2, Model 5, met role expectations are positively associated with warmth perceptions ($b = .28$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$). The indirect effect of moral objection on warmth perceptions through met role expectations is positive and significant when legitimate power is high (indirect effect = .37, $SE = .10$, 95% CI [.19, .60]), but not significant when legitimate power is low (indirect effect = .09, $SE = .06$, 95% CI [−.01, .24]), supporting Hypothesis 2.

Discussion

Study 1 explored how actors' behavior (compliance vs. moral objection) and legitimate power influence observers' met role

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[1] The pattern of results and significance levels we report do not change when severity of ethical violation and observers' imagined attraction are not included as control variables. The pattern of results also does not change when quality of participant's prior relationship with the focal employee is not included. However, when this control is omitted the post hoc comparison for the perceived warmth of low-power focal employees who engage in moral objection versus compliance becomes nonsignificant ($d = −.25$, $S.E. = .29$, *ns*) and the conditional indirect effect of moral objection on perceived warmth via met role expectations at low levels of legitimate power becomes positive and significant (effect = .36, $SE = .16$, 95% CI [.05, .68]). The significance levels of all other effects, including the Behavior × Legitimate Power interaction predicting warmth perceptions and the difference between the conditional indirect effects of moral objection on perceived warmth via met role expectations at low and high levels of legitimate power, do not change based on whether prior relationship quality is included as a control. Because the results of our preliminary analyses suggested prior relationship quality may be influenced by the experimental condition to which participants were assigned and it is also strongly correlated with both met role expectations and perceived warmth, we follow the guidance of Becker (2005) and Bernerth and Aguinis (2015) and report results with this variable included.

[2] The difference scores in this article are calculated as moral objection – compliance and high legitimate power – low legitimate power.

Figure 2. Study 1: Actors' behavior and legitimate power predicting observers' warmth perceptions. Error bars represent $+/-$ 1 standard error.

expectations and warmth perceptions in a sample of employees who reported on their prior workplace experiences. Extending prior work, the results demonstrate that the extent to which moral objection reduces warmth perceptions depends on the actor's level of legitimate power. Although moral objection reduces observers' warmth perceptions when enacted by low-power employees, it increases observers' warmth perceptions when enacted by high-power employees. These effects are mediated by the extent to which the actor's behavior meets observers' role expectations, and remain significant after controlling for the primary self-threat mechanism identified by prior research (observers' imagined attraction), as well as the quality of the preexisting relationship between the participant and the focal employee and the severity of the ethical violation.

Study 2

Method

The central objective of Study 2 was to explore whether the warmth perceptions produced by the interaction of moral objection

and legitimate power influence observers' social sanctions. We conducted an online experiment that tested Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 3, and Hypothesis 4 by considering whether warmth perceptions mediate the interactive effect of moral objection and legitimate power on observers' sanctioning intentions. Like Study 1, Study 2 employed a 2 (Behavior: Compliance vs. Moral Objection) $\times$ 2 (Legitimate Power: Low vs. High) between-subjects design, but used a new sampling strategy and example of moral objection. Moreover, we held the characteristics of the unethical event and focal actor constant across all participants to ensure the results were not influenced by event-specific or actor-specific attributes.

Participants. Using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), we recruited 202 full-time employees to complete an online hiring simulation. MTurk is an online marketplace for virtual work where "requesters" post short tasks for "workers" to complete for a small fee (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). Participants recruited via MTurk have been shown to be more representative of the U.S. population than participants from traditional (student) subject pools, and provide comparable or superior quality responses (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). We limited recruitment to U.S.-based workers with a prior acceptance rate of at least 95%. Participants had an average age of 31.23 years ($SD = 8.65$), 63% were male, 75% were Caucasian, 10% were Asian American, and the average work experience was 11.69 years ($SD = 8.14$).

Procedure. Participants responded to a series of background questions that were included to ensure the believability of our experimental manipulations. Specifically, we asked participants to describe the industry they worked in, their number of direct reports, and their level of authority over organizational decisions. Participants then completed a hiring simulation that was similar to the racist/sexist police line-up task described by Monin et al. (2008). In the simulation, we asked participants to select one of three candidates to fill a managerial position at a boutique hotel, and write a short explanation of why they selected that candidate. We provided participants with pictures and brief profiles of the three candidates. One of the candidates was a Caucasian male, one was an African American male, and one was a Caucasian female. We manipulated the candidates' profiles to describe the Caucasian

Table 2
Study 1: Summary of Moderated Mediation Analysis for Warmth Perceptions

| | DV = Met role expectations | | | | | | DV = Warmth perceptions | | | |
| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | | Model 5 | |
Variable	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Constant	2.82**	.07	2.41**	.13	2.65**	.13	4.27**	.08	3.87**	.24
Severity of ethical violation	.13**	.05	.10*	.04	.09*	.04	.03	.05	−.01	.05
Prior relationship quality	.40**	.09	.37**	.09	.40**	.08	.60**	.10	.52**	.10
Observers' perceived liking	.30**	.09	.28**	.09	.26**	.09	.42**	.10	.32**	.10
Behavior			.83**	.14	.33†	.19			−.63**	.21
Legitimate power			.02	.13	−.47*	.18			−.51*	.21
Behavior $\times$ Legitimate Power					.98**	.26			.70*	.30
Met role expectations									.28**	.07
R^2		.32		.41		.44		.44		.50
ΔR^2				.09**		.03**				.06**

Note. $N = 239$. Behavior dummy coded $0 =$ compliance, $1 =$ moral objection. Legitimate power dummy coded $0 =$ low, $1 =$ high.
† $p < .10$, two-tailed. * $p < .05$, two-tailed. ** $p < .01$, two-tailed.

male candidate as clearly the most qualified for the position, while describing the other candidates in ways that were consistent with negative race and gender stereotypes. The complete profiles are provided in Appendix C.

After selecting a candidate, participants were asked to assess the warmth of a prior participant based on his or her responses to the hiring simulation. Participants were given information (created by the research team) about the prior participant's background, choice of candidates, and rationale.

Behavior manipulation. Consistent with the procedure and verbiage used by Monin et al. (2008, Study 2), some participants (compliance condition) viewed a prior participant who followed the instructions for the hiring task and selected the Caucasian male candidate, Jacob Henderson. The prior participant's explanation of his or her hiring decision read: "I think Jacob Henderson is the most suitable because (1) he has a high GPA, (2) he graduated from a good college, and (3) he has previous experience." Other participants (moral objection condition) saw the response of a prior participant who refused to complete the hiring task. The participant did not select a candidate and wrote the following statement: "I refuse to make a choice here for this task is obviously biased. It is offensive to portray the Caucasian male to be the obvious most suitable candidate, while stereotyping African Americans and Caucasian females. I refuse to play this game."

Legitimate power manipulation. We told participants that the prior participant was selected based on his or her response to the background questions. We told participants in the high legitimate power condition that the prior participant was selected because, "he/she occupies a high-level position in the hospitality industry, with a very large amount of formal authority over organizational decisions and more than 20 employees who report directly to him/her." We told participants in the low legitimate power condition that the prior participant was selected because "he/she occupies a low-level position in the hospitality industry, with no formal authority over organizational decisions and no employees who report directly to him/her."[3]

Warmth perceptions. After reading the prior participant's response, participants rated how warm they believed he or she was using the three-item measure from Study 1 (α = .90).

Social sanctions. We instructed participants to imagine that they and the prior participant had been given jobs at the boutique hotel described in the hiring task, and to indicate how likely they would be to engage in social sanctions toward the prior participants. Based on a review of the whistleblowing literature (e.g., Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2008), we identified five types of social sanctions that can be levied against individuals who object to an institutionalized practice. Participants used a 7-point, Likert-type scale to rate their likelihood of engaging in each sanctioning behavior toward the prior participant (1 = *very unlikely*, 7 = *very likely*). The items are provided in Appendix D. We conducted an exploratory factor analysis of participants' responses using a principle components extraction method and Varimax rotation with a minimum eigenvalue of .5. This resulted in a one-factor solution, explaining 75.29% of the total variance. All five items exhibited factor loadings of at least .70 on this primary factor and no other factors were extracted. We averaged the items to create a five-item measure of observers' sanctioning intentions (α = .88).

Control variables. Given the hiring task invoked unflattering stereotypes of women and racial minorities, we were concerned that it might have also activated gender/racial identities in non-Caucasian or female participants (Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999), influencing their responses to our dependent measures. If this were true, the salience of these identities would constitute a potential alternative explanation for our results. Thus, we considered participant race (0 = Caucasian, 1 = non-Caucasian) and gender (0 = female, 1 = male) as potential controls.

Results

Excluded participants. Eight participants did not select the Caucasian male candidate to fill the vacant position. Because the tendency to perceive moral objectors negatively is stronger among individuals who have themselves complied with the procedure the objector protests, we followed the procedure reported by Monin et al. (2008) and excluded these individuals from subsequent analyses. Following the same procedure as Study 1, to guard against careless responding we also excluded the nine additional participants who completed the study in an unusually short period of time or used the same scale anchor point to respond to at least eight consecutive items (Meade & Craig, 2012). This left 186 valid participants. The pattern of results and significance levels we report do not change when the excluded participants are included.

Manipulation checks. All 90 participants in the compliance condition indicated that the prior participant completed the hiring task as instructed. In the moral objection condition, 90 of 95 participants indicated that the prior participant refused to complete the hiring task, and one participant did not provide a response $\chi^2(1, N = 184) = 168.67$, $p < .001$. We also asked participants to indicate what type of formal position the prior participant occupied. In the low legitimate power condition, 92 of 99 participants indicated that the prior participant occupied a low-level formal position. In the high legitimate power condition, 84 of 87 participants indicated that the prior participant occupied a high-level formal position $\chi^2(1, N = 186) = 148.38$, $p < .001$.

Warmth perceptions. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations between study variables. Given the marginally significant correlation between gender and sanctioning intentions, we retained gender as a control variable in our subsequent analyses. The pattern of results and significance levels we report do not change when gender is not included. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the association between moral objection and observers' warmth perceptions is more negative when the actor is low in legitimate power than when the actor is high in legitimate power. We tested this hypothesis by conducting a two-way ANOVA with planned post hoc comparisons. There is a significant main effect for behavior, $F(1, 180) = 96.29$, $p < .001$ $\eta_p^2 = .35$, such that prior participants who engage in compliance are perceived as warmer

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[3] To test whether our observed effects extended to other forms of social power, we also included an expert power condition in this study. The results for expert power were consistent with, albeit weaker than, those we describe for legitimate power and as such we do not report them. The weaker results are consistent with role theory's emphasis on the importance of legitimate power in engendering role expectations. More information about the excluded condition, including a description of the expert power manipulation and the complete results, is available from the first author upon request.

Table 3

Study 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5
1. Ethnicity	.25	.43	—				
2. Gender	.63	.49	−.11	—			
3. Behavior	—	—	.03	−.01	—		
4. Legitimate power	—	—	−.06	−.06	−.04	—	
5. Warmth perceptions	4.12	1.30	.05	−.03	−.58**	.06	—
6. Sanctioning intentions	1.60	.88	.03	.12†	.06	−.06	−.22**

Note. $N = 185–186$ due to missing data. Ethnicity coded $0 =$ Caucasian, $1 =$ Non-Caucasian. Gender coded $0 =$ female, $1 =$ male. Behavior coded $0 =$ compliance, $1 =$ moral objection. Legitimate power coded $0 =$ low, $1 =$ high.

† $p < .10$, two-tailed. ** $p < .01$, two-tailed.

than prior participants who engage in moral objection. The main effect for legitimate power is not significant, $F(1, 180) = .28$, ns, $\eta_p^2 = .00$, but legitimate power interacts with behavior in predicting warmth perceptions, $F(1, 180) = 6.19$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. Post hoc comparisons revealed that actors who engage in moral objection are seen as less warm than compliant actors regardless of their level of legitimate power $M_{\text{compliance—low legitimate power}} = 5.06$, $SE = .16$, $M_{\text{moral objection—low legitimate power}} = 3.16$, $SE = .16$, $d = -1.90$, $SE = .21$, $p < .001$, $M_{\text{compliance—high legitimate power}} = 4.75$, $SE = .16$, $M_{\text{moral objection—high legitimate power}} = 3.62$, $SE = .16$ $d = -1.13$, $SE = .23$, $p < .001$. However, moral objectors who are high in legitimate power are seen as significantly warmer than objectors who are low in legitimate power, $d = .47$, $SE = .22$, $p < .05$. These results support Hypothesis 1—the relationship between moral objection and warmth perceptions is more negative when the actor is low in legitimate power.

Social sanctions. Hypothesis 3 predicts that an actor's behavior and legitimate power interact to predict observers' social sanctions, such that the association between moral objection and sanctions is more positive when the actor is low in legitimate power then when the actor is high in legitimate power. Figure 3 displays intended social sanctions by condition. A two-way ANOVA did not reveal a significant main effect of behavior, $F(1, 180) = .50$, ns, $\eta_p^2 = .00$ or legitimate power, $F(1, 180) = .48$, ns, $\eta_p^2 = .00$ on sanctioning intentions. However, there is a significant Behavior × Legitimate Power interaction effect on sanctioning intentions, $F(1, 180) = 7.13$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. As shown in Figure 3, moral objection is positively associated with sanctioning intentions when the actor is low in legitimate power $M_{\text{compliance—low legitimate power}} = 1.42$, $SE = .13$, $M_{\text{moral objection—low legitimate power}} = 1.85$, $SE = .11$, $d = .43$, $SE = .18$, $p < .05$, while there is not a significant relationship between moral objection and sanctioning intentions when the actor is high in legitimate power $M_{\text{compliance—high legitimate power}} = 1.67$, $SE = .13$, $M_{\text{moral objection—high legitimate power}} = 1.42$, $SE = .12$, $d = -.25$, $SE = .19$, ns. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported.

Using Model 8 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013), we conducted a moderated path analysis to test Hypothesis 4, which predicts that observers' warmth perceptions mediate the interactive effect of behavior and legitimate power on social sanctions. As shown in Table 4, Model 3, behavior and legitimate power interact to predict warmth perceptions ($b = .77$, $SE = .31$, $p < .05$). Moreover, as shown in Table 4, Model 5, these warmth perceptions are negatively associated with observers' sanctioning inten-

tions ($b = -.16$, $SE = .06$, $p < .05$). The conditional indirect effect of moral objection on sanctioning intentions via warmth perceptions is positive and significant whether the objector is low (indirect effect = .30, $SE = .15$, 95% CI [.04, .64]) or high (indirect effect = .17, $SE = .09$, 95% CI [.03, .40]) in legitimate power, but the effect is significantly more positive when the objector is low in legitimate power (Δ indirect effect = $-.12$, $SE = .08$, 95% CI [$-.36$, $-.01$]). These results support Hypothesis 4.

Discussion

Study 2 built on Study 1 by exploring how the warmth perceptions engendered by the interaction of compliance or moral objection and legitimate power influence observers' sanctioning intentions. Unlike Study 1, we observed a main effect of behavior on warmth perceptions, such that moral objectors are perceived as less warm than compliant individuals regardless of their level of legitimate power. However, consistent with Study 1 we observed an interaction of behavior and legitimate power such that the negative association between moral objection and perceived warmth is weaker for objectors who are high rather than low in legitimate power. Moreover, we found that these differential warmth perceptions influence observers' intentions to sanction moral objectors by engaging in activities such as bullying them, pressuring them not to speak up in the future, and intentionally being unfriendly toward them. It is important to note, however, that a limitation of Study 2 is that it assessed social sanctions using participants' behavioral intentions. Although research testing the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) suggests that behavioral intentions are often highly accurate predictors of actual behavior, there are also circumstances under which individuals' behavior departs from their intentions. Moreover, participants generally reported low sanctioning intentions, which may be a function of the rather severe nature of the sanctions we examined.

Figure 3. Study 2: Actors' behavior and legitimate power predicting observers' sanctioning intentions. Error bars represent +/− 1 standard error.

Table 4
Study 2: Summary of Moderated Mediation Analysis for Warmth Perceptions

Variable	DV = Warmth perceptions						DV = Sanctioning intentions			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Constant	4.16**	.16	4.92**	.17	5.14**	.19	1.46**	.11	2.06**	.35
Gender	−.07	.20	−.09	.16	−.13	.16	.22	.13	.24	.13
Behavior			−1.54**	.16	−1.90**	.21			.14	.21
Legitimate power			.09	.16	−.31	.22			.21	.18
Behavior × Legitimate Power					.77**	.31			−.57*	.26
Warmth perceptions									−.16*	.06
R^2		.00		.35		.37		.02		.09
ΔR^2				.35**		.02*				.08**

Note. $N = 185$ due to missing data. Behavior dummy coded 0 = compliance, 1 = moral objection. Legitimate power dummy coded 0 = low, 1 = high.
* $p < .05$, two-tailed.   ** $p < .01$, two-tailed.

Study 3

Method

Study 3 was a laboratory experiment that was designed to replicate the effects we observed in Study 2 in a new population of participants and include a behavioral assessment of observers' social sanctions in the form of providing negative feedback (e.g., scolding, criticizing, expressing disappointment). Like Study 2, Study 3 used a 2 (Behavior: Compliance vs. Moral Objection) × 2 (Legitimate Power: Low vs. High) between-subjects design and tested Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 3, and Hypothesis 4.

Participants.   A sample of 144 students from the paid subject pool of a large Midwestern university participated in exchange for $7. The average age of participants was 19.93 years ($SD = 1.98$), 63% were female, 59% were Caucasian and 22% were Asian or Asian American. Participants had an average of 2.83 years of total work experience ($SD = 1.52$).

Procedure.   This study employed a modified version of the virtual team task procedure developed by Mayer, Nurmohamed, Treviño, Shapiro, and Schminke (2013) (see Study 3 for a more complete description of the procedure). As in Study 2, to ensure the believability of our legitimate power manipulation participants completed a short survey about their past work experiences and level of formal authority they had in those roles. We then instructed participants to work virtually to complete a business case with three other participants ostensibly at other locations. We told them that another member of their team had been formally appointed as the leader based on his or her responses to the initial survey, whereas they had been assigned to the role of team member. They were told the designated leader had been selected because he or she indicated that he or she occupied a high-level position in a student group, with 20 or more direct reports and "a very high" level of formal authority.

The business case involved a fictitious home furnishings company, East Oak, which was considering expanding its product line to include handmade rugs. The case indicated that forced or bonded child labor was frequently used in the production of such rugs, although East Oak's supplier assured it no child labor would be used. We told participants that their team would be using the Porter's Five Forces framework (Porter, 1979) to analyze whether

it made *financial* sense for East Oak to enter the rug market. We assigned participants one of the Five Forces (The Intensity of Competitive Rivalry) and gave them 10 min to recommend, based on this force, whether or not East Oak should begin sell the handmade rugs. We informed participants that their individual responses would be combined with those submitted by their team members to create the team's final report. To increase participants' motivation, we also told them that at the conclusion of the study each member of the team judged to have the best report would receive $50. While they worked on the business case, participants exchanged instant messages with the other members of their team using a chat window on the right of their screen. In reality, there were no other team members. The instant messages participants received were scripted by the research team and sent at designated times using a computer program. The content of the chat was pilot-tested prior to the study to ensure it was believable.

Behavior manipulation.   We exposed participants to one of two scripted chats. The complete chat transcripts are provided in Appendix E. Both chats began with dialogue intended to reassure participants that the instant messages were real. Toward the end of the task, participants in the moral objection condition received a series of instant messages from a member of their team informing them that he or she had decided not to complete his or her part of the report because he or she was concerned that child labor would be used to manufacture the rugs. The objector's language was adapted from a script provided by Monin et al. (2008, Study 1). Participants in the compliance condition received messages from a member of their team suggesting that he or she had completed the task as instructed.

Legitimate power manipulation.   We manipulated legitimate power by changing the level of formal authority possessed by the team member who sent the objecting or compliant instant messages. Participants in the high legitimate power condition viewed messages sent by their group's formal leader, while participants in the low legitimate power condition viewed messages sent by a nonleader team member.

Warmth perceptions.   After participants submitted their responses to the business case, they rated the warmth of the other team member who had engaged in moral objection or compliance using the three-item measure from Studies 1 and 2 ($\alpha = .80$).

Social sanctions. Participants rated their intention to sanction the team member that sent the objecting or compliant messages using the five-item measure from Study 2. ($\alpha = .84$).

We also asked participants to take approximately 5 min to write a short (one paragraph) feedback message to the other team member. We told participants that their message would be shared with this person, and asked them to include feedback about his or her performance in the study, whether he or she engaged in any behaviors that bothered them or that they found inappropriate, and whether they enjoyed having him/her as a teammate. Two independent coders, who were blind to hypotheses and condition, rated the content of the feedback messages using a 5-point, Likert-type scale (1 = *very positive*, 5 = *very negative*). The negative messages typically scolded, criticized, and/or expressed disappointment toward the team member who engaged in compliance or moral objection. An example of a *very negative* feedback message is, "You were a very ineffective group member. The behavior you engaged in, deciding not to finish the project, is completely unacceptable. We were a team and you were assigned your role as a job. It is not a choice just to back up and let everybody down—it was quite selfish. I would never again want you as a team member, plus I doubt you would have a job after this." In contrast, the positive messages typically expressed praise, agreement, liking, and admiration. An example of a *very positive* feedback message is, "I would like to thank you for re-awakening/actively pursuing being the sound of reason in this experiment. I think everyone became caught up in the logistics of this experiment, if the business was profitable and not the information about the child labor usage in that area, which went forgotten as it often does in today's world. I deeply respect you and hope you continue to advocate for those who are not afforded a voice." The initial interrater agreement of the two coders was very high ($\alpha = .95$). They met to discuss their discrepancies and determine a final code for negative feedback, which we used as a second measure of social sanctions.

Results

Excluded participants. All participants completed the case analysis as instructed. However, eight participants expressed suspicions as to the authenticity of the computerized chat during debriefing and were excluded. Although the fact this study was conducted in person ensured no participants completed the surveys unusually quickly, to guard against careless responding we also excluded two participants who used the same scale anchor point to respond to at least eight consecutive survey items (Meade & Craig, 2012). This resulted in a final sample of 134 valid participants. The pattern of results and significance levels that we report do not change when the excluded participants are included.

Manipulation checks. We asked participants whether the team member they had been asked to evaluate spoke up about unethical behavior during the study. In the compliance condition, 64 of 66 participants indicated that the team member in question did not speak up about unethical behavior. In the moral objection condition, 65 of 68 participants indicated that the team member spoke up about unethical behavior, $\chi^2(1, N = 134) = 114.77, p < .001$. All participants correctly identified whether the team member they were evaluating did or did not occupy a position of formal authority within their group.

Warmth perceptions. Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the relationship between moral objection and observers' warmth perceptions is more negative when the actor is low in legitimate power then when the actor is high in legitimate power. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for both behavior, $F(1, 130) = 54.03, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .29$, and legitimate power, $F(1, 130) = 6.51, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .05$, on warmth perceptions, such that team members who engage in compliance and/or are high in legitimate power are perceived as warmer than team members who engage in moral objection and/or are low in legitimate power. These main effects are qualified by a significant Behavior × Legitimate Power interaction, $F(1, 130) = 5.30, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .04$. Post hoc comparisons revealed that moral objection (relative to compliance) reduces observers' warmth perceptions regardless of the actor's level of legitimate power $M_{\text{compliance—low legitimate power}} = 5.56, SD = .92, M_{\text{moral objection—low legitimate power}} = 3.82, SD = 1.01, d = -1.74, SE = .26, p < .001, M_{\text{compliance—high legitimate power}} = 5.61, SD = 1.12, M_{\text{moral objection—high legitimate power}} = 4.70, SD = 1.10, d = -.91, SE = .25, p < .001$. However, moral objectors are seen as significantly warmer when they are high rather than low in legitimate power $d = .88, S.E. = .25, p < .001$. These results support Hypothesis 1—the relationship between moral objection and warmth perceptions is more negative when the actor is low in legitimate power.

Social sanctions. Hypothesis 3 predicts that behavior and legitimate power interact to predict observers' social sanctions such that the association between moral objection and sanctions is more positive when the actor is low in legitimate power then when the actor is high in legitimate power. We tested this hypothesis with respect to both social sanctioning intentions and negative feedback. As shown in Table 5, the two measures of social sanctions are positively correlated, such that individuals who provide more negative feedback are also significantly more likely to intend to engage in the sanctions described in our measure, $r = .40, p < .001$. A two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of behavior on sanctioning intentions, $F(1, 130 = 9.93, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .07$, such that participants intend to sanction moral objectors more than compliant team members. The main effect of legitimate power is not significant, $F(1, 130) = .00, ns, \eta_p^2 = .00$, but there is a significant Behavior × Legitimate Power interaction, $F(1, 130) = 4.54, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .03$. As shown in Figure 4A, engaging in moral objection is positively associated with observers' sanctioning intentions when the actor is low in legitimate power $M_{\text{compliance—low legitimate power}} = 1.26, SD = .44, M_{\text{moral objection—low legitimate power}} = 1.98, SD = 1.05, d =$

Table 5

Study 3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4
1. Behavior	—	—	—			
2. Legitimate power	—	—	.00	—		
3. Warmth perceptions	4.92	1.27	−.52**	.19*	—	
4. Sanctioning intentions	1.62	.82	.26**	−.01	−.32**	—
5. Negative feedback	2.41	1.41	.45**	−.06	−.55**	.40**

Note. N = 134. Behavior coded 0 = compliance, 1 = moral objection. Legitimate power coded 0 = low, 1 = high.
* p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed.

A. Sanctioning Intentions

B. Negative Feedback

Figure 4. Study 3: Actors' behavior and legitimate power predicting observers' sanctioning intentions and negative feedback. Error bars represent $+/-$ 1 standard error.

.72, $SE = .20$, $p < .001$. However, there is not a significant relationship between moral objection and sanctioning intentions when the actor is high in legitimate power $M_{\text{compliance—high legitimate power}} = 1.54$, $SD = .73$, $M_{\text{moral objection—high legitimate power}} = 1.68$, $SD = .79$, $d = .14$, $SE = .19$, *ns*. These results support Hypothesis 3 with respect to sanctioning intentions.

When negative feedback is considered as the dependent variable, there is also a main effect of behavior, such that participants provide more negative feedback to actors who engage in moral objection than those who engage in compliance, $F(1, 130) = 36.95$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .22$. The main effect of legitimate power is not significant, $F(1, 130) = .49$, *ns*, $\eta_p^2 = .00$ but there is again a significant Behavior × Legitimate Power interaction effect, $F(1, 130) = 12.29$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$, as shown in Figure 4B. Post hoc comparisons revealed that when the actor is low in legitimate power, engaging in moral objection increases negative feedback $M_{\text{compliance—low legitimate power}} = 1.47$, $SD = .72$, $M_{\text{moral objection—low legitimate power}} = 3.48$, $SD = 1.52$,

$d = 2.02$, $SE = .30$, $p < .001$. When the actor is high in legitimate power engaging in moral objection also marginally increases negative feedback $M_{\text{compliance—high legitimate power}} = 2.06$, $SD = 1.23$, $M_{\text{moral objection—high legitimate power}} = 2.60$, $SD = 1.24$, $d = .54$, $SE = .29$, $p < .10$. However, actors who engage in moral objection receive significantly less negative feedback when they are high rather than low in legitimate power, $d = -.89$, $SE = .30$, $p < .01$. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was also supported with respect to negative feedback— the association between moral objection and negative feedback is more positive when the actor is low in legitimate power than when the actor is high in legitimate power.

We conducted two moderated path analyses using Model 8 of the PROCESS macro to test Hypothesis 4, which predicts that the interactive effect of behavior and legitimate power on social sanctions is mediated by observers' warmth perceptions. As shown in Table 6, Model 2, behavior and legitimate power interact to predict warmth perceptions ($b = .83$, $SE = .36$, $p < .05$). Moreover, as

Table 6
Study 3: Summary of Moderated Mediation Analyses

Variable	DV = Warmth perceptions				DV = Sanctioning intentions		DV = Negative feedback	
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	b	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*	*b*	*SE*
Constant	5.35**	.16	5.56**	.18	2.08**	.39	3.94**	.56
Behavior	−1.32**	.18	−1.74**	.26	.46*	.22	1.24**	.33
Legitimate power	.47*	.18	.05	.26	.29	.19	.61*	.28
Behavior × Legitimate Power			.83*	.36	−.46†	.27	−1.11**	.40
Warmth perceptions					−.15*	.07	−.44**	.10
R^2			.31		.33		.13	.38
Δ R^2					.03*			

Note. $N = 134$. Behavior coded 0 = compliance, 1 = moral objection. Legitimate power coded 0 = low, 1 = high.
† $p < .10$, two-tailed.   * $p < .05$, two-tailed.   ** $p < .01$, two-tailed.

shown in Table 6, Models 3 and 4, observers' warmth perceptions are negatively associated with their sanctioning intentions ($b = -.15$, $SE = .07$, $p < .05$) and negative feedback ($b = -.44$, $SE = .09$, $p < .01$). The indirect effect of moral objection on sanctioning intentions through warmth perceptions is positive and significant whether the actor is low in legitimate power (indirect effect $= .26$, $SE = .09$, 95% CI [.10, .44]) or high in legitimate power (indirect effect $= .14$, $SE = .07$, 95% CI [.04, .31]), but it is significantly more positive when the actor is low in legitimate power (Δ indirect effect $= -.12$, $SE = .06$, 95% CI [$-.30$, $-.03$]). Similarly, the indirect effect of moral objection on negative feedback through warmth perceptions is positive and significant whether the actor is low (indirect effect $= .77$, $SE = .20$, 95% CI [.43, 1.21]) or high (indirect effect $= .40$, $SE = .17$, 95% CI [.14, .83]) in legitimate power, but it is significantly more positive when the actor is low in legitimate power (Δ indirect effect $= -.37$, $SE = .16$, 95% CI [$-.74$, $-.10$]). Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported with respect to both sanctioning intentions and negative feedback.

Discussion

Study 3 replicated and extended the findings from Study 2 to actual as well as intended social sanctions in the context of a virtual team task. We captured feedback messages participants wrote to a member of their team who engaged in compliance or moral objection and found a significant relationship between the content of these messages and the same measure of intended sanctions from Study 2, such that participants who indicated they were more likely to sanction the focal team member also wrote more negative feedback messages. Moreover, we found a similar pattern of effects across the two measures of sanctions and across Study 2 and Study 3. Collectively, individuals who engage in moral objection are more likely to be sanctioned then compliant individuals, but objectors who are high in legitimate power are significantly less likely to be sanctioned than objectors low in legitimate power, and these effects are mediated by observers' warmth perceptions.

General Discussion

We sought to better understand the factors that influence how organization members who engage in moral objection are perceived. Drawing on role theory (Biddle, 1986; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Katz & Kahn, 1978), we identified legitimate power as an individual difference that influences the extent to which observers perceive moral objectors to be warm and subject them to social sanctions. Across three experiments and different examples of moral objection, we found that although moral objection (as compared to compliance) is negatively associated with the perceived warmth of actors low in legitimate power, this relationship is less negative (Study 2 and Study 3) or even positive (Study 1) for actors high in legitimate power. Moreover, we found that the extent to which moral objection meets observers' role expectations partially explains the differential perceptions of high and low power objectors, even when controlling for the self-threat mechanism identified by prior research. Finally, we found that the level of warmth attributed to actors influences observers' intentions to subject the actors to social sanctions such as bullying, threats, and peer pressure, and also the amount of negative feedback they provide.

Theoretical Contributions

The present article significantly extends what we know about the consequences of speaking up about ethically questionable occurrences in organizations. Although few studies have directly examined moral objection as we define it, research in some related domains (e.g., punishment, voice) suggests that individuals who take action in response to ethically questionable practices can inspire positive responses in observers (e.g., Grant et al., 2009; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009; Treviño, 1986; Treviño & Ball, 1992; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998; Whiting et al., 2008), while research in other related domains (e.g., whistleblowing) suggests this type of behavior can also engender negative responses (Mesmer-Magnus & Visweswaran, 2005; Minson & Monin, 2012; Monin, 2007; Monin et al., 2008). The present studies help to reconcile these conflicting findings by suggesting that actors' legitimate power plays a key role in determining how their moral objection or compliance is received. We also extend the existing literature on moral objection by drawing on role theory to explain why high-power moral objectors tend to be perceived less negatively than low-power objectors. In so doing, we complement prior work that has invoked primarily self-threat mechanisms in explaining observer responses to moral objection, and begin to identify the conditions under which observers who have previously complied with an ethically questionable procedure will view others who object to it less negatively. Finally, we show how the warmth perceptions engendered by the interaction of compliance or moral objection and legitimate power influence observers' social sanctioning behavior—presenting the first theory and evidence linking the perceptual and interpersonal consequences of moral objection.

Our results also contribute to organizational role theory. Although a good deal of research has focused on how role expectations shape the subsequent behavior of organization members, less work has examined the consequences of failing to conform to these expectations, which is a highly relevant issue given the social nature of work (Biddle, 1986; Dierdorff, Rubin, & Bachrach, 2012). We demonstrate several ways that individuals sanction or intend to sanction others who violate their role expectations: by viewing them as less warm, by intending to engage in behaviors such as bullying, peer pressure, and unfriendly actions, and by providing them with more negative feedback about their behavior. Organizational role theory also tends to view differences in legitimate power as being beneficial for organizations. Although this may generally be the case (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), we find that these differentials and their corresponding behavioral expectations can also cause lower-power individuals who stand up to unethical practices to receive more negative responses than high-power individuals who engage in the same behavior.

Practical Implications

Our findings also have important implications for organizations seeking to curtail unethical activity. One such implication is that, despite the prevailing wisdom that preventing unethical conduct requires stance-taking from individuals at all levels of the organization (Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010; Leavitt et al., 2012; Miceli

et al., 2009; Sumanth et al., 2011), this stance-taking is less costly for individuals high in legitimate power. Although others have suggested that formal authority figures play an important role in encouraging ethical conduct in organizations (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Carlson & Perrewe, 1995; Mayer, Kuenzi, Greenbaum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009), we find that formal authority figures may also be less likely to incur a cost for objecting to ethically questionable actions. An implication of these findings is that individuals engaging in moral objection would be well-served to highlight any formal authority they possess, as this is likely to reduce the negative interpersonal consequences they might experience. Interestingly, our results suggest that it is not necessary to have legitimate authority *over* those who observe one's objection: simply occupying a high-level formal position may be sufficient.

Second, our results suggest that organizations interested in encouraging moral objection among members who are low in legitimate power should consider interventions targeted at changing the role expectations for these individuals, particularly with regards to the appropriate response to ethically questionable situations. Given moral objection tends to violate widely held role expectations for low-power individuals, it may be necessary to take steps to change members' expectations regarding how appropriate and desirable it is for low-power individuals to raise questions about the ethicality of organizational practices. These steps might take the form of communications from the CEO or top management to the effect that raising questions about the ethicality of a prevailing procedure is always reasonable and appropriate, or making efforts to recognize and reward ethical "watchdogs" at all levels. Such communication and incentives might help ensure that when individuals in low-power positions raise concerns about the ethicality of a particular task or procedure, it conforms to rather than violates observers' expectations about the "right" way for these individuals to behave.

Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research Directions

The theoretical and practical contributions of this research notwithstanding, it is subject to certain limitations, which suggest future research directions. First, while the studies we present here each test a portion of our conceptual model, no one study provides a comprehensive test. Although we gain confidence from the fact that most of the findings we report are replicated across multiple studies, future research testing our entire conceptual model simultaneously would be valuable.

Second, in Study 2 and Study 3 we asked participants to self-report demographic information, including their level of legitimate power, before they completed our experimental procedure. Although this enhanced the believability of our manipulations, it is possible that collecting demographic information in this order made participants' actual level of legitimate power more salient, influencing their subsequent responses. Similarly, it is also possible that we may have manipulated participant's feelings of low power by having the actors in some of our conditions be high in power. To minimize this concern, we conducted a supplemental analysis in which we examined whether participant's warmth perceptions, social sanctioning intentions, and the amount of negative feedback they provided in Studies 2 and 3 differed according to their actual level of legitimate power, measured in terms of their

level of authority over organizational decisions (0 = none, 5 = a very large amount) and their number of direct reports (1 = none, 2 = 0–5, 3 = 6–10, 4 = 11–15, 5 = 15 or more). Participants' authority over organizational decisions and number of direct reports are not significantly correlated with either warmth perceptions, retaliation intentions, or negative feedback. Moreover, the pattern of results and significance levels we report for Study 2 and Study 3 do not change if authority over organizational decisions and/or number of direct reports are included as control variables. Nevertheless, future research could further rule out the possibility that participants' actual levels of power or feelings of low power influenced our findings by adopting designs in which demographic information is collected at the conclusion of the study and considering participants' personalized sense of power (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012) as a potential statistical control.

Third, we took several steps to rule out demand characteristics, including minimizing the cues we provided to participants about the nature of our hypotheses (Orne, 1962), attempting to reduce evaluation apprehension via our informed consent process and instructions (Weber & Cook, 1972), and randomly presenting the items within each scale. However, we measured our mediators prior to our dependent variables in all three studies, and in Study 1 and Study 2 we relied on measures collected from the same source on the same survey. Given met role expectations and warmth perceptions involve participants' inner cognitions and may not be externally observable, we felt self-report was the most accurate way to assess them. However, there is a risk that common source bias and/or demand effects artificially inflated some of the reported relationships (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Several pieces of evidence suggest this risk is small. In Study 3, no participants were able to identify the true purpose of the study, suggesting that our efforts to conceal our research questions from participants were successful. Moreover, in Study 1 any common method variance or socially desirable responding would have been reflected in participant's responses to the "observers' imagined attraction" control variable (Lindell & Whitney, 2001), so the fact that the results do not change when including this control variable is encouraging. We are also encouraged that we replicated the findings from Study 2 in Study 3 using a behavioral measure of social sanctions. However, future research could provide additional safeguards against common method variance and demand effects by measuring the constructs in our model at different points in time or from different sources, embedding focal measures in filler items, or varying the presentation of the dependent variable and mediator measures.

Fourth, although our results are largely consistent across studies, there is one inconsistency that could benefit from additional research attention. Specifically, in Study 1 actors high in legitimate power who engaged in compliance were viewed as *lower* in warmth than high-power actors who engaged in moral objection. However, in Studies 2 and 3 high-power actors who engaged in compliance were viewed as *higher* in warmth than those who engaged in moral objection. This difference can be attributed to a significant and negative main effect of moral objection on warmth perceptions in Studies 2 and 3, which we did not find in Study 1. Although we cannot draw definitive conclusions, the nature of the moral objection committed by the focal actors in Studies 2 and 3 was slightly different than that in Study 1, which we speculate may have contributed to the negative main effect in these studies.

Specifically, in Studies 2 and 3 actors who engaged in moral objection not only objected to a practice they felt was unethical, they also refused to do something that was perceived to be a requirement in an experimental study. This difference could have contributed to participants' perceiving the moral objectors in Studies 2 and 3 as less friendly and nice (i.e., lower in warmth) then the moral objectors in Study 1, who generally did not refuse to complete a required procedure. This suggests that future research might explore how differences in the actions taken by individuals who engage in moral objection, or the manner in which they voice their objections (Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980) influence observers' warmth perceptions and subsequent reactions.

Finally, although prior research has established that the organizational context plays an important role in determining how members respond to unethical behavior, we did not consider organization-level attributes in the present research. Although we believe our findings from Study 1 demonstrate that the reported effects are relevant to instances of moral objection and compliance that occur in a wide variety of organizational contexts, it is important for future research to examine how contextual features might influence our findings. Our results suggest it would be particularly useful to examine whether and how contextual factors limit the extent to which moral objectors who are low in legitimate power are perceived negatively or sanctioned by others. For instance, research could explore whether the strength of organizations' ethical climate (Victor & Cullen, 1988), shared norms about what is and is not ethically appropriate (Treviño, 1992), formal ethics programs (Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 1999) communication and surveillance mechanisms (Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe, & Umphress, 2003), or the level of ethical leadership exhibited by top managers (Brown et al., 2005) influence the extent to which low-power members who engage in moral objection violate observers' role expectations and therefore are viewed as lower in warmth or sanctioned.

The limitations of this research should be considered in light of its considerable strengths. We found evidence supporting the importance of legitimate power in determining how moral objectors are perceived and responded to across several different ethically questionable situations and examples of moral objection. Using experimental methodology and random assignment to condition enabled us to infer causality between our independent and dependent variables, and rule out potential confounds and alternative explanations more comprehensively than is possible in survey-based research (Singleton & Straits, 1999). The fact that we replicated our effects in both the lab and the field and in samples of both working individuals and college students enhances our confidence in the generalizability of our findings, as does the fact that participants in our experimental studies completed tasks similar to those performed by members of actual organizations. Indeed, prior research investigating the relevance of experimental findings to real-world settings have consistently reported very large positive correlations between lab and field results (Anderson, Lindsay, & Bushman, 1999; Locke, 1986). Finally, although each of our individual studies is subject to certain limitations, most of these limitations were addressed in the design of subsequent studies, such that the package of studies as a whole offers strong support for the internal validity and generalizability of our conclusions.

Conclusion

The importance of moral objection in organizations seems irrefutable, but individuals who engage in this behavior can receive mixed reactions. Our results help make sense of these reactions by demonstrating that as a result of widely held role expectations, individuals who take principled stands against ethically questionable activities suffer negative interpersonal consequences if they are low in legitimate power, but that these consequences are less severe for actors who are high in legitimate power. Unfortunately, these findings suggest that the organization members who may have the most insight into ethical misconduct are also the members most likely to be viewed negatively and sanctioned for speaking out against this misconduct. We hope that articulating this inconvenient truth will inspire additional research aimed at enabling members of organizations to take action against perceived injustice safely and effectively.

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(*Appendices follow*)

Appendix A

Study 1: Pilot Test of Met Role Expectations Scale

Participants

We conducted a pilot test of the met role expectations measuring using a separate sample of 188 working individuals living in the United States. Participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and received $.50 for completing a short online survey. Participants' average age was 34.54 years (*S.D.* = 11.26) years, 59% were male, 76% were Caucasian, 8% were African American, and they had an average of 13.04 years of work experience (*S.D.* = 11.26).

Procedure and Measures

Participants read a vignette about an individual who refused to complete an assigned speech task, and then rated the individual using the met role expectations measure used in Study 1 (α = .87) and four related scales. To compare our measure of met role expectations with other, non-role specific measures of met expectations, we included an adapted version of Robinson's (1996) two-item scale assessing the extent to which individuals' expectations about their employer were met (α = .80). We also included a modified version of Gaffney, Gaffney, and Beichner's (2010) measure of expectation conformity (five items, α = .91). To compare our measure with measures of other role-based constructs in the literature, we included adapted versions of Rizzo, House, and Lirtzman's (1970) measures of role conflict (two items, α = .75) and role ambiguity (three items, α = .73).

Results

The three-item met role expectations measure medium to large positive correlations with the two broader (non-role-based) measures of met expectations (r = .29 p < .01) and expectation conformity (r = .40, p < .001), and large negative correlations with the measures of role conflict (r = −.54, p < .001) and role ambiguity (r = −.45, p < .001). A confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL v. 8.72 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 2005) indicated that a five-factor model with each scale loading onto a separate factor fit the data well, $\chi^2(82)$ = 177.79, CFI = .96, NNFI = .94 RMSEA = .08, and better than a series of four-factor models with met role expectations loading together with met expectations, $\chi^2(85)$ = 355.87, CFI = .88, NNFI = .85 RMSEA = .15, $\Delta\chi^2(3)$ = 178.08, p < .001, expectation conformity, $\chi^2(85)$ = 429.71, CFI = .84, NNFI = .80 RMSEA = .17, $\Delta\chi^2(3)$ = 251.92, p < .001, role conflict, $\chi^2(85)$ = 262.33, CFI = .92, NNFI = .90 RMSEA = .12, $\Delta\chi^2(3)$ = 84.54, p < .001, and role ambiguity, $\chi^2(85)$ = 294.61.79, CFI = .90, NNFI = .88 RMSEA = .13, $\Delta\chi^2(3)$ = 116.82, p < .001, respectively. The five-factor model also provided superior fit to a one-factor model with all scales loading on a single factor, $\chi^2(90)$ = 636.59, CFI = .75, NNFI = .71 RMSEA = .23, $\Delta\chi^2(3)$ = 458.80, p < .001. These results support the convergent and discriminant validity of the three-item measure of met role expectations.

(Appendices continue)

Appendix B

Study 1: Unethical or Ethically Questionable Events Identified by Participants

Event	Count	Representative response
Theft	33	"A coworker (nonmanagement) adjusted the status of a product and sold the item for a small amount and pocketed the difference from new price to original price."
Incivility	29	"We are a group of parking officers working for a university. We were all in the conference room getting ready to clock out and go home. One male officer was on the phone with his wife, and another male officer started teasing the one on the phone about having to ask his wife permission to wipe his own butt and other disparaging remarks."
Sexual harassment	22	"We are designing a new video game. One of my teammates made a sexually suggestive comment towards one of my female teammates. We were creating a female character in the game and deciding on how she was going to look when one of my teammates suggested that she look like our colleague because she was super hot. The female colleague was clearly uncomfortable but no one spoke up."
Shirking	20	"Was working in a group where we had to pass out flyers about an event that was going to be in a good part or attractive part of the city. One of the people working with me decided to not to pass out flyers in the less desirable neighborhoods."
Fraudulent reporting	18	"Data inaccuracies were discovered from one of the plants. They were reporting one number but reports from the systems showed a much worse number."
Racist/sexist remark	18	"I was sitting during lunch break and one of my coworkers with about the same rank as anyone else was there and told us a racist joke. Only one or two laughed out of 10 people enjoying lunch. We didn't think it was that funny due to the context of the joke. It was insulting."
Violating company policy	16	"We had a nurse fail to say anything to an assistant who had told someone sensitive information about a patient."
Inappropriate sexual/romantic relationship	13	"I was on a committee to select a new bank for a large corporation. One of my coworkers started having an affair with the bank representative that we were working with that included weekend trips, fancy dinners, gifts, etc. This person had a big part in the final decision of which bank to switch the multiple company accounts."
Drinking/drug use	13	"Coworker came to work high on pot. This person would take lunch and smoke pot in their car. You could smell it on her and see it in her eyes."
Favoritism/discrimination	12	"A team was put together in the IT department to plan for network expansion from 100mb to gigabit Ethernet. The high-level person moved everything towards getting his department the best equipment available at a cost of subpar equipment for other departments. The turnout was that other departments suffered a severe lack of performance for network tasks."
Taking credit for/stealing someone else's work	10	"Working in the resort industry, we had a working group to assist in accommodating a high level government group. Work had been given to a smaller subgroup. One person generally did not participate/assist in preparations. When the time came to roll out the proposals, this person stepped forward and intimated that they were key to the group's success."
Cheating/lying	8	"There was an online test, for our knowledge, that someone cheated on by copying the answers from someone else."
Selling a defective/low quality product	7	"I was on a team doing research and development on a current product and a department executive said that we should use a lower quality material to produce the product and just be quiet about it. She said if any one questioned it she would handle it."
Rudeness to clients	6	"There was a phone call that a coworker had answered. When we answer calls no matter what we must be understanding or get help but never be rude. There was a person on the phone wanting some information and the worker was angry and very nasty because this person had a thick accent and was hard to understand."
Other	14	"Our organization recently worked to revise our job descriptions for a salary study being done. A team from our dept. was assigned to work on it. One person on that team tried to deliberately give me my job description at the last day so that I would not have time to work on it and passed an old version that I had not edited yet to my boss."
Total	239	

(*Appendices continue*)

Appendix C

Study 2: Candidate Profiles in Racist/Sexist Hiring Task

	Caucasian male	African-American male	Caucasian female
Name	Jacob Henderson	DeMarcus Johnson	Elizabeth Brown
GPA	3.9	2.5	2.9
Education	Yale University	Delaware County Community College	Radcliffe College
Work experience	Two years in Hilton's management development program	Entry-level position at McDonald's for 1 year	One year of experience as a Hollister sales clerk
References	Extremely positive	Lukewarm	Lukewarm
Extracurriculars	Editor of school newspaper	None	Tri Delta

Appendix D

Study 2: Sanctioning Intention Items

Item	Factor loading
Bully the prior participant.	.90
Insult or put down the prior participant.	.90
Spread negative rumors about the prior participant.	.89
Intentionally be unfriendly toward the prior participant.	.86
Pressure the prior participant not to speak up about ethical concerns in the future.	.79

Appendix E

Study 3: Transcript of Instant Messages by Condition

Compliance—Low legitimate power	Compliance—High legitimate power	Moral objection—Low legitimate power	Moral objection—high legitimate power
LEADER: Hey guys, I guess they made me the leader. I am looking forward to working with you all. Let's try and win the $50!			
LEADER: Remember to use this chat windoe if you have ideas or need help			
MEMBER 1: hello			
MEMBER 3: hi			
MEMBER 3: Is this real?			
MEMBER 1: haha I think so. I was wondering that too!			
LEADER: This feel like class lol			
LEADER: I got the bargaining power of customers, what about you guys?			
MEMBER 1: bargaining power of suppliers			
MEMBER 3: Threat of subsitute products or services			
LEADER: ok great thanks - lets all take a few mins to work on our respective parts			
MEMBER 1: Hey guys I just want to let you know that im putting the finishing touches on now	LEADER: Hey guys I just want to let you know that im putting the finishing touches on now	MEMBER 1: Hey guys I just want to let you know that I thought about it and I don't think I am going to finish my part	LEADER: Hey guys I just want to let you know that I thought about it and I don't think I am going to finish my part

(Appendices continue)

Appendix E (*continued*)

Compliance—Low legitimate power	Compliance—High legitimate power	Moral objection—Low legitimate power	Moral objection—high legitimate power
MEMBER 1: ok im done. Based on my part, it seems like for financal reasons this company shouldnt enter the market.	LEADER: ok im done. Based on my part, it seems like for financal reasons this company shouldnt enter the market.	MEMBER 1: I know this is a study, but I can still do what I want, right? I don\'t think it is right to recommend that this company start making rugs when it seems like child labor would be used for sure to make them. Experimenters, if you are reading this I am not going to do something that I am not 100% comfortable doing . . . sorry	LEADER: I know this is a study, but I can still do what I want, right? I don\'t think it is right to recommend that this company start making rugs when it seems like child labor would be used for sure to make them. Experimenters, if you are reading this I am not going to do something that I am not 100% comfortable doing . . . sorry
MEMBER 1: what do you guys think?	LEADER: what do you guys think?	MEMBER 1: what do you guys think?	LEADER: what do you guys think?